Unlike the other major currencies, the Australian Dollar and the NZ dollar had lower interest rate than the US dollar on forward contract in the post GFC period. The purpose of this paper is to explore why this happened through estimating the covered interest parity (CIP) condition. In the analysis, we focus on a unique feature of Australia and New Zealand where short-term interest rates remained significantly positive even after the GFC. The paper first constructs a theoretical model where increased liquidity risk causes deviations from the CIP condition. It then tests this theoretical implication by using daily data of six major currencies. We find that both money market risk measures and policy rates had significant effects on the CIP deviations.
Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) and the following instability in the world economy had enormous impacts on international markets. A number of studies argued that large scale asset purchases by a central bank was effective in mitigating the impacts and helped stabilize financial markets (see, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010] ). However, since each country faced different macroeconomic environments, the degree of monetary expansion was heterogeneous across countries in the post GFC period. The purpose of this paper is to explore how different monetary expansion affected international money market instability in the post GFC period. Specifically, we calculate deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) condition and examine how distinct monetary policy in Australia and New Zealand made their deviations so unique on the forward contract.
Using overnight index swap (OIS) rates as secured shot-term interest rates, Figure 1 depicts daily deviations from CIP condition between the US dollar and each of the five non-US dollar currencies: the Euro, the UK pound, the Japanese yen, the Australian dollar, and the NZ dollar.
The sample period is from 2 January 2006 to 29 February 2016. Splitting the sample before and after 1 January 2010, we calculated the deviations by annualized value of (1+i September 2008. The CIP condition suggests that the US dollar had lower interest rate than any other currency in the crisis. In the global crises, a flight to quality became serious. Consequently, increased demand for the US dollar as international liquidity made its interest rate lower than those of the other major currencies on the forward market.
Even in the second subsample period (that is, 2 January 2010 to 29 February 2016), significant upward deviations had occurred frequently for the Euro, the UK pound, and the Japanese yen. In particular, reflecting the Euro crisis, the Euro frequently showed large upward deviations from 2010 to 2012 and in 2015. However, unlike these currencies, the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar had significant downward deviations in the second subsample period.
This implies that unlike the other major currencies, these currencies had lower interest rate than the US dollar on the forward market after the GFC.
In the following analysis, we explore what made the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar so different from the other major currencies in the CIP condition after the GFC. In the analysis, we especially focus on a distinct feature of Australia and New Zealand where short-term interest rates remained significantly positive even after the GFC. Figure 2 depicts each central bank's policy rate on daily basis. Soon after the Lehman shock, central banks in the USA, the UK, the Euro zone, and Japan adopted unconventional monetary policy to aid recovery from deflationary economy. As a result, short-term interest rates hit the zero bound and fell into "liquidity trap" in these advanced economies. In contrast, in Australia and New Zealand where inflation rates were within their target range, short-term interest rates remained significantly positive. Consequently, even if world financial markets were still in turbulence, both Australia and New Zealand became exceptional advanced economies that did not fall into "liquidity trap" after the GFC.
In the following sections, we first construct a representative agent model in a small open economy and examine how international liquidity risk is reflected in the CIP condition. It is shown that increased liquidity risk may widen the CIP deviations but monetary expansion may mitigate the deviations. We then test this theoretical implication by examining the CIP condition in major currencies after the GFC. We find that various risk measures were determinants of deviations from the CIP condition after the GFC. In particular, currency-specific money market risk was critical in explaining the deviations. However, we also find that policy rates set by central banks were another important determinant of deviations from the CIP condition. The latter result supports our hypothesis that the distinct monetary policy feature in Australia and New Zealand made their CIP deviations so unique on the forward contract.
In previous literature, several studies have explored why the CIP condition was violated in the GFC. Baba and Packer (2009a,b) find that CIP deviations were negatively associated with the creditworthiness of European and US financial institutions. The authors such as Fong, Valente, and Fung (2010) and Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009) show that in addition to credit risk, liquidity and market risk played important roles in explaining the deviations. Grioli and Ranaldo (2010) find that the results were essentially the same even if we used secured rates such as OIS. Fukuda (2016a) explores why the UK pound showed smaller deviations than the Euro after the GFC, while Fukuda (2016b) finds that in the GFC, the Tokyo market had larger deviations than the London and the New York markets even though Japanese banks were more sound and healthy than EU and US banks. The following analysis confirms some of the findings in previous studies, especially those based on secured rates. However, unlike previous studies, our analysis pays a special attention to the different effects of monetary policies which have not been discussed explicitly in literature.
1 There are several studies which have examined the effects of central bank liquidity provisions during the global financial crisis. The authors such as Goldberg, One important implication of this paper is that the CIP condition is violated not only by liquidity risk in the international money market but also by different monetary policy regimes after the GFC. In the economy where the central bank set its policy rate to be zero, precautionary demand for local liquid assets becomes negligible because the local money market faces little liquidity risk. In contrast, in the country where the central bank's policy rate is far above zero, there still exits significant precautionary demand for local liquid assets. It is thus likely that the difference between unconventional and conventional monetary policies would result in different deviations in the CIP condition after the GFC.
The Theoretical Model
To see how liquidity risk is reflected in the CIP condition, we consider a representative agent model in a small open economy. In the economy, there are two liquid assets (that is, local safe asset and foreign safe asset) and two monies (that is, local money and foreign money). The local liquid asset and local money are denominated in the local (non-US dollar) currency, while the foreign liquid asset and foreign money are denominated in the international currency (that is, the US dollar). The representative consumer chooses his or her stream of real consumption and asset holdings so as to maximize the following expected utility:
where C t+j = real consumption at period t+j. β is discount factor such that 0 < β < 1 and E t is conditional expectation operator based on the information at period t. In the following analysis, we denote nominal values of local and foreign liquid assets at the end of period t by A t and A * t and nominal values of local and foreign monies at the end of period t by M t and M * t respectively. For all t, the consumer maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
where P t = domestic price, i t-1 = nominal interest rate of local liquid asset, i * t-1 = nominal interest rate of foreign liquid asset, S t = spot exchange rate, F t = forward exchange rate, Y t = real domestic output, L t = real losses from liquidity shocks, and T t = nominal lump-sum transfer from the government. For all variables, subscript denotes time period.
Because of nominal contract, the consumer cannot hedge inflation risk for the two liquid assets and two monies under the budget constraint (2). However, since F t is forward exchange rate contracted in period t-1, the consumer covers the foreign asset's exchange risk by the forward contract. Thus, even if the spot exchange rate is volatile, the consumer faces no uncertainty on the one-period nominal return from holding the foreign liquid asset.
In our economy, both local and international liquidity shocks, that is, θ t L and θ * t L * , hit the economy and deteriorate the domestic output Y t at the beginning of each period. The size of the production losses, however, depends on liquid assets and monies the consumer holds in period t.
Following a shopping time model in literature, we assume that θ t L is decreasing and convex M t /P t ) and θ expansion were different.
After the GFC, in the economies such as the Euro zone and Japan, the central bank adopted unconventional monetary policy and kept its local nominal interest rate close to zero. Thus, in these economies, M t increased dramatically, which might have led to a decline in the absolute value of θ t L 1 (A t /P t , M t /P t ). In contrast, in the countries such as Australia and New Zealand, the central bank kept its local nominal interest rate positive even after the GFC. In these countries, the expansion of M t was limited, so that a decline in the absolute value of θ t L 1 (A t /P t , M t /P t ) was likely to be modest. This implies that the absolute value of θ t L 1 (A t /P t , M t /P t ) might have been larger in Australia and New Zealand than in the Euro zone and Japan after the GFC. Comparing deviations from the CIP condition in Australia and New Zealand with those in EU and Japan, the following sections explore the validity of this conjecture.
Empirical Specification
The purpose of the following sections is to examine why the CIP condition of several major currencies, which had shown similar deviations in the GFC, showed asymmetric deviations after the GFC. Using the US dollar as the benchmark currency, the following analysis investigates what determined the CIP deviations between the US dollar and each of six currencies: the Euro, the UK pound, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar, and the NZ dollar.
We chose these currencies because they are currencies in advanced economies which imposed no capital control but adopted different monetary policies after the GFC. By using daily data, we estimate the following equation:
where j = the Euro, the UK pound, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar, and the NZ dollar. Risk t (j) and Risk t (US) are money market risk measure in currency j and the US dollar respectively, while Rate t (j) and Rate t (US) are the policy rate in currency j and the
The right hand side of (7) includes constant term, lagged dependent variables, money market risk measures, policy rates, and control variables as explanatory variables. The use of money market risk measures as explanatory variables is standard in literature. In the financial turmoil, some traders are not given as much "balance sheet" to invest, which is perceived as a shortage of liquidity to them. Under this situation, the traders are reluctant to expose their funds during a period of time where the funds might be needed to cover their own shortfalls. Consequently, in the crisis when foreign exchange markets come under stress, money market risk measures may capture financial market tightness in each currency.
it is a desirable variable to capture the effect of monetary policy in reducing liquidity risk. After the GFC, one group of countries adopted unconventional monetary policy and set their policy rate to be almost zero. The other group of countries adopted conventional monetary policy and maintained their policy rate far above zero. The use of the policy rates thus can test whether the different monetary policies had different impacts on the CIP deviations. To the extent that lowering the policy rate reduces liquidity risk in the money market, we can expect that the policy rate of currency j has a negative effect on Dev t (j), while the policy rate of the US dollar has a positive effect on Dev t (j).
One may argue that either the base money or the money stock is more appropriate than the policy rate to capture the effects of the monetary policy. But since their daily data is not available, we cannot estimate eq. (7) on daily basis by using the base money or the money stock.
More importantly, once the policy rate hit the zero bound, the economy falls into "liquidity trap"
where an increase in the base money or the money stock might no longer be effective in reducing the absolute value of θ t L 1 and θ * t L * 1 . Thus, to the extent that M t increases as the policy rate declines only when the policy rate is positive, the policy rate is a more appropriate policy measure to capture the effects on θ t L 1 and θ * t L * 1 when the policy rate can hit the zero bound.
In addition to these key variables, we also include two types of control variables. One is a credit risk measure in country in period t. To measure the country-specific credit risk, the following analysis uses the credit default swap (CDS) prices for country q (q = the United States, UK, Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). We use the daily time series of the 5-year sovereign CDS. The data is downloaded from Datastream, which is based on Thomson Reuters CDS. After the GFC, soared sovereign risk hit mainly Euro member countries because of the Euro crisis. This suggests that credit risk had country-specific features after the GFC. We explore whether different country risk had different impacts in the sample period.
The other control variable is a global market risk measure in period t. To measure the global market risk measure, we use the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) which is a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market and therefore, more costly options. Often referred to as the fear index, the VIX represents a measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30-day period. The data is downloaded from Datastream. We explore whether the global market risk had different impacts in the two subsample periods.
Key Explanatory Variables and Their Basic Statistics

Currency-specific money market risk
To measure the currency-specific money market risk, the following analysis uses the spread between LIBOR and OIS rate in currency h (h = the US dollar, the Euro, the UK pound, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar, and the NZ dollar). LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) is a daily reference rate in the London interbank market calculated for various currencies, while OIS rate is a daily secured rate that removes counter-party credit risks.
3 LIBOR, which were published by the British Bankers' Association after 11:00 a.m. each day (Greenwich Mean Time), is based on the interest rates at which banks borrow unsecured funds from other banks in each currency. Each spread thus reflects a counterparty credit risk in currency h. In calculating the spread, we use daily data of 3-month LIBOR and 3-month OIS rate for each currency. All of the data are downloaded from Datastream. Table 1 However, because of the Euro crisis, the spread of the Euro increased to over 40 basis points in 2011.
In contrast, the Australia dollar and the NZ dollar were a relatively safe currency in the international money market in the GFC. The mean of the spreads was about 50 basis points in measurement errors would be small.
NZ dollar. Their mean fell below 20 basis points in the following years. It indicates that
Australia and New Zealand faced almost the same degree of money market risk as the other advanced economies. However, they had higher standard deviation than the other advanced countries, implying potential money market volatility in the Australia dollar and the New Zealand dollar in the post-GFC period.
Policy rate
Policy rates set by central banks are key variables in our estimations. Soon after the Lehman shock, central banks in the USA, the UK, the Euro zone, and Japan adopted unconventional monetary policy to aid economic recovery. As a result, short-term interest rates hit the zero bound and fell into "liquidity trap" in these advanced economies. In contrast, in Australia and New Zealand, short-term interest rates remained significantly positive. Consequently, both
Australia and New Zealand became exceptional advanced economies that did not fall into "liquidity trap" even after the GFC. Table 3 . It shows that both money market risk measures and policy rates had significant effects on the CIP deviations. In particular, many of them had the same signs for most of the major currencies. This implies that the determinants of the CIP deviations were common across the major currencies. The result is noteworthy because the CIP condition showed downward deviations in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar but upward deviations in the other major currencies throughout the sample periods.
Currency-specific money market risk
Currency-specific money market risk measures were not statistically significant for the Euro.
This may have happened because the Euro crisis increased serious sovereign risk but did not increase money market risk in the Euro zone. But except for the Euro, the spread denominated in the currency j had a significantly negative effect on the deviations, while the US dollar-denominated spread had a significantly positive effect on the deviations.
The symmetric results indicate that the foreign exchange forward markets were very sensitive to a liquidity shortage in each currency and that increased market risk made its liquidity tighter and decreased its secured interest rate on the forward contract. In particular, an increase in the US dollar-denominated spread had a significantly positive effect on the deviations in most of the major currencies. Even in the post-GFC period, the US dollar maintained its role as international liquidity in the money market. Thus, global liquidity shortage still made the US dollar interest rate lower on the forward contract when money market risk increases in the US dollar.
Regarding the effects of local currency spread, the Japanese yen was most sensitive to the local money market risk. This may reflect yen's unique feature that local currency spread was suppressed to be low in the post-GFC period. But the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar were also very sensitive to the local money market risk. Unlike in the other major currency, local currency spreads were very volatile in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar in the post-GFC period. It is likely that the volatile currency-specific market risk increased demand for the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar on forward contract and made their CIP deviations unique.
Policy rates
The local policy rate was not statistically significant for the Euro and the Japanese yen. This may reflect the fact that under "liquidity trap", the policy rate changed little in the Euro zone and Japan for our sample period. But in the other currencies, the policy rate in the currency j had a significantly negative effect on the deviations, while the US policy rate had a significantly positive effect on the deviations. The symmetric results indicate that less expansionary monetary policy made liquidity of the currency tighter and decreased the secured interest rate on the forward contract.
The result has especially important implication for the CIP deviations in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar. Soon after the Lehman shock, central banks in the USA, the UK, the Euro zone, and Japan adopted unconventional monetary policy to achieve recovery from deflationary economy. As a result, their short-term interest rates hit the zero bound and fell into "liquidity trap". In contrast, in Australia and New Zealand where the inflation rates were within the target range, short-term interest rates remained significantly positive. Consequently, both Australia and New Zealand became exceptional advanced economies that did not fall into "liquidity trap"
even after the GFC. Thus, relatively larger policy rate in the post GFC period increased demand for the local currency and made the CIP deviations unique in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar.
Other variables
Local sovereign CDS, had rather heterogeneous effects across the currencies. They had a significantly negative effect in the Japanese yen, the NZ dollar, and the UK pound. In these currencies, increased demand for local currency lowered local interest rate on forward contract when local sovereign risk rises. In contrast, Germany sovereign CDS had a large positive effect in the Euro. This implies that unlike in the other major currencies, the demand for the US dollar Until the last sections, we explored determinants of the CIP deviations in the six major currencies and found that the determinants were common across the major currencies. In particular, we found that both money market risk measures and policy rates had very similar effects on the CIP deviations. The purpose of this section is to examine how well the similar significant effects could explain very different CIP deviations in the six major currencies.
Specifically, using the estimated coefficients in Table 3 and realized values of explanatory variables, we calculate the theoretical value of the CIP deviations as follows.
where ℎ �, � , , ̂, , ̂1 , ̂2 , and ̂3 are the estimated coefficients in Table 3 . Since our main interest is to calculate the steady-state value of the CIP deviations, equation (8) is formulated so as to obtain the long-run value of � (j) after adjusting the lagged effects.
For currency j, we investigate contributions of each of the seven explanatory variables to � (j) in each year. Table 4 reports the contributions of each explanatory variable in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 When we compare contributions of the seven explanatory variables, the US dollar spread had a large positive effect in the Australian dollar, the Japanese yen, the NZ dollar, and the UK pound in 2009. Soon after the GFC, money market risk in the US dollar increased the demand for the US dollar and lowered the US interest rate on forward contract. However, the contributions of the US dollar spread declined significantly after 2010. In contrast, because the Euro crisis, the local sovereign risk, the US dollar sovereign risk, and VIX had large contributions in the Euro throughout the sample period.
The most noteworthy feature is that the local policy rate had the largest contributions in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar. In the post-GFC period, the CIP condition showed downward deviations in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar but upward deviations in the other major currencies. This indicates that the policy rates could explain the different CIP deviations among the six major currencies. 
Robustness
The purpose of this section is to explore robustness of our empirical results. In checking the robustness, we allow two additional effects on the CIP deviations in the regressions. One is the effects of unconventional monetary policies. In previous sections, we used the policy rates to capture the effects of monetary policy. They are desirable variables in the post-GFC period because additional monetary expansion might no longer be effective once the policy rate hit its zero bound. However, even if the policy rate hit its zero bound, some unconventional monetary policies could have been effective in reducing liquidity risk. In reaction to the GFC, several central banks implemented quantitative easing (QE) by buying financial assets from commercial banks and other financial institutions. We thus investigate how our empirical results will change when we allow these QE policies.
The other is the effects of commodity prices. Australia and New Zealand are resource rich countries whose local financial markets may be susceptible to turbulence in global commodity 
2016).
Including these additional variables, we estimated equation (7) for the Australian dollar, the NZ dollar, the Japanese yen, and the UK pound. Except that we included additional variables, the estimation methods, that is, GARCH(2,2) regressions, are the same as those in previous sections. Table 5 However, it is worthwhile to note that even if we allow these additional effects, our main results in previous sections remained robust. That is, the local currency spread had a significantly negative effect on the deviations, while the US dollar spread had a significantly positive effect on the deviations. More importantly, the local policy rate had a significantly negative effect on the deviations, while the US policy rate had a significantly positive effect on the deviations. The estimated effects of the local policy rate became rather larger in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar when we allow these additional effects. This confirms our view that the policy rates in the Australian dollar and the NZ dollar could explain their unique CIP deviations in the post-GFC period.
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to explore what made the Australian Dollar and the NZ dollar so different in the CIP condition. In the analysis, we focused on a unique feature of Australia and New Zealand where short-term interest rates remained significantly positive even after the GFC. The paper first constructed a theoretical model where not only increased liquidity risk but also different monetary policies may cause deviations from the CIP condition. The paper then tested this theoretical implication by using money market risk measures and policy rates in six major currencies. We found that both money market risk measures and policy rates had similar effects on the CIP deviations in the six major currencies. The result supported our hypothesis that unique monetary policy in Australia and New Zealand made deviations from the CIP condition distinct on the forward contract.
In general, the monetary policy has two goals: price stability and financial stability. When the financial market becomes unstable in a deflationary economy, monetary expansion lowering the policy rate is effective to achieve the tow goals. However, when the financial market becomes unstable in an inflationary economy, the central bank faces a conflict because it cannot achieve both of the goals at the same time. After the GFC, the central bank in Australia and New
Zealand faced such a conflict. Unlike the other advanced economies, Australia and New Zealand had inflation rates which were almost within the target range. As a result, even if the world financial market was still unstable, the policy rate remained significantly different from zero in Australia and New Zealand. Our empirical results supported the view that this caused unique feature on forward contract in Australia and New Zealand. Table 3 .
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